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Viewing cable 09TRIPOLI638, PRODDING LIBYA TO ACTION ON TIME SENSITIVE ISSUES REF: A) TRIPOLI 599; B) TRIPOLI 632 TRIPOLI 00000638 001.2 OF 003 CLASSIFIED BY: Gene Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, Department of State. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09TRIPOLI638 2009-08-05 15:03 2011-01-31 21:09 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Tripoli
VZCZCXRO5429
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0638/01 2171534
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P R 051534Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5121
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0217
RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1103
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0548
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0776
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5661
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 TRIPOLI 000638 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR NEA/MAG, DRL/NEASA (CHARRIS), ISN; TREASURY FOR PAUL 
BURKHEAD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  8/5/2019 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM UNGA ABLD CVIS ETRD MASS PARM LY
SUBJECT: PRODDING LIBYA TO ACTION ON TIME SENSITIVE ISSUES REF: A) TRIPOLI 599; B) TRIPOLI 632 TRIPOLI 00000638 001.2 OF 003 CLASSIFIED BY: Gene Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, Department of State. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

1.(S/NF) Summary: FM-equivalent Musa Kusa told the Ambassador August 5 that Libya was ready at any time to host the U.S. interagency delegation that will launch the bilateral Human Rights Dialogue in Tripoli and agreed that the dialogue could take place as early as next week. He assured the Ambassador that the agreement to transfer Libya's highly enriched uranium and low enriched uranium (HEU/LEU) would be finalized by August 15. Kusa emphasized that he and his staff were under a lot of pressure due to the extensive preparations they needed to undertake in advance of the August 31 AU Summit, the 40th anniversary commemoration of Qadhafi's seizure of power on September 1, the Leader's participation in the UN General Assembly, and Libya's potential participation in the Africa-South America Summit in Caracas at the end of September. Kusa requested the Ambassador's personal assistance in postponing U.S. delegations - apart from the visit of the Human Rights Dialogue delegation - until after September 1.He also asked the Ambassador to ensure high-level U.S. official representation at the September 1 celebration and noted the importance of setting the agenda soon for a potential POTUS-Qadhafi meeting in New York. End Summary.

ARGUING FOR IMMEDIATE START OF HUMAN RIGHTS DIALOGUE

2.(S/NF) During an August 5 meeting with Libya's Foreign Minister-equivalent Musa Kusa, the Ambassador (accompanied by Pol/Econ chief) pressed for action on time sensitive and critical issues on the bilateral agenda. These included launching a bilateral Human Rights Dialogue; signing of the HEU/LEU fuel transfer agreement; signing of the Trade and Investment Framework Agreement; approval of the end-use monitoring agreement for military assistance; approval of an NEC site; and resolution of Libya's payment for seven U.S. properties. The Ambassador reviewed developments in the relationship that had led to the proposal for commencing the Human Rights Dialogue and stressed that it was essential that the Libyans host the interagency delegation and launch the bilateral Human Rights Dialogue prior to UNGA. The commencement of the Human Rights Dialogue would help facilitate progress in other areas of the bilateral relationship. It would also help contribute to a more substantive and rich discussion between POTUS and Colonel Qadhafi, if that were able to be arranged, on the margins of UNGA. He reminded Kusa that Acting NEA Assistant Secretary Jeffrey Feltman had presented the same points during his July 26 visit to Libya (Ref A).

HEU/LEU: AUGUST 15 REAL DEADLINE

3.(S/NF) The Ambassador also reiterated that Libya had to sign the HEU/LEU fuel transfer agreement by August 15. He emphasized that August 15 was a real deadline, given that the USG had other commitments in this area and there were not enough transport materials available to allow for a Libyan delay. If Libya did not initial the agreement by that date certain, it risked being relegated to a position on the list that would allow the shipment to be completed only after a few years. If the Libyans allowed that to happen, they would not be able to fulfill their WMD commitments.

SEEKING PERMISSION FOR THE NEC

4.(S/NF) On the NEC, the Ambassador said that we now had one site that we were exclusively looking at and that we might need to expend a considerable sum of money to convince the landlord to take the property off the market while we did a full assessment of it. We therefore needed GOL permission - as soon as possible - to buy the property if that was the decision we reached after the assessment. We did not, in any case, want to be in a position of having spent that money for the assessment and then having the GOL refuse us permission to purchase it. Kusa said he would have a governmental committee look into the issue. The Ambassador also asked for Kusa's assistance in seeking to free up the payment (5.2 million dollars) for the seven USG properties, which appeared to be stuck somewhere between the Land Registry Office and the Ministry of Finance.

5.(S/NF) The Ambassador also reviewed for Kusa the planned visits of Special Envoy Gration (since postponed), the McCain CODEL (August 13-14), and the Meeks CODEL (August 29), stressing that Kusa should make an effort to inform us as soon as possible TRIPOLI 00000638 002.2 OF 003 whether the Leader would be available to meet any, if not all, of the delegations.

READY TO HOST HUMAN RIGHTS DIALOGUE DELEGATION

6.(S/NF) Kusa told the Ambassador that Libya was ready to proceed on all of the proposals he outlined and was ready to receive the interagency Human Rights Dialogue delegation. He noted that he was under several time constraints that could interfere with the GOL's ability to move quickly. Kusa expressed concern about receiving a large number of different delegations at the same time the GOL was preparing for the AU Summit on August 31, the 40th anniversary of Qadhafi's coming to power on September 1, Qadhafi's travel to New York for UNGA, and Qadhafi's possible travel to Caracas in September for an Africa-South America Summit. Kusa emphasized that he accorded priority to the launching of the Human Rights Dialogue within the bilateral agenda and stated that the GOL delegation would be ready to receive the delegation as early as next week. Kusa explained that the Libyan side of the dialogue would include representatives from the Justice Ministry-equivalent, the General People's Congress, and the Human Rights Department within the Foreign Ministry-equivalent.

7.(S/NF) He asked the Ambassador several times to postpone other visits, including those by the congressional delegations, until after September 1. However, without any guarantees, he agreed to look into the possibility of arranging a meeting between CODEL McCain and the Leader, and he said he would consider receiving other delegations after hosting the Human Rights Dialogue delegation. Kusa took note of the Ambassador's comment that congressional recess ends at the beginning of September, and therefore the chances of congressional travel after that time would be problematic.

TABLING OTHER ISSUES

8.(S/NF) Regarding the HEU/LEU fuel transfer agreement, the FM confirmed that the GOL was in the process of moving it forward and that he was considering transferring the file to the National Security Council (i.e., Muatassim al-Qadhafi) for further development. The other issue areas the Ambassador addressed could be discussed at another sitting, he said, noting that the Human Rights Dialogue was the most important issue of the day.

MUSA KUSA'S CONCERNS: VISAS FOR DIPLOMATS AND SEPTEMBER 1 ATTENDANCE

9.(S/NF) Kusa then proceeded to highlight two areas of concern: delayed visas for Libyan diplomats assigned to work at Libya's Embassy in Washington and Mission to the UN in New York; and securing high-level U.S. official attendance at the September 1 celebration. He asked the Ambassador to look into the status of delayed visa applications for several Libyan diplomats, which he said had been pending for a month. He then turned to the subject of high-level invitations which had been carefully thought out and proffered by Libya to the USG but for various reasons had been refused. He said that the Leader had personally extended an invitation to POTUS to attend the July AU Summit in Sirte ("but for some reason he could not come") and had personally invited Special Envoy George Mitchell to visit Tripoli ("but for some reason he could not come"). Kusa said that now he had invited the Secretary to attend the September 1 anniversary events (Ref B). He expressed Libya's hopes for high-level U.S. attendance, as it would be very meaningful to Libya and an important signal of the USG commitment to the bilateral relationship. He noted that several presidents of African and Arab nations were expected to attend, as well as some European heads of state. Kusa asked the Ambassador to take personal care to ensure that a high-level U.S. official is present, implying that yet another rejection would not be well-received.

10.(S/NF) Kusa concluded by asserting the need to set the agenda in the near future for a potential meeting between POTUS and Qadhafi on the margins of UNGA. The Ambassador said that he would reach out to Washington for guidance and discuss this and other issues with Kusa when he (Ambassador) returned from leave at the end of the month. TRIPOLI 00000638 003.2 OF 003

11.(S/NF) Comment: Kusa's readiness to move forward on the Human Rights Dialogue reflected his understanding that the initiative was critical on two points for Libya: that it would open up other channels of cooperation and was needed if there were to be any possibility of a high-level meeting in NYC. It is also clear that Kusa is under some pressure to produce high-level USG representation at the September 1 festivities, especially in light of "hurt" Libyan feelings over past "rejected" invites. We look forward to receiving guidance regarding the USG position on attendance at the 40th anniversary celebration. End Comment. CRETZ